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The Transformation of the Juvenile Court
Barry C. Feld*
I. INTRODUCTION
Ideological changes in the cultural conception of children
and in strategies of social control during the nineteenth century
led to the creation of the juvenile court. At the dawn of the
twentieth century, Progressive reformers applied the new theo-
ries of social control to the new ideas about childhood and cre-
ated a social welfare alternative to criminal courts to treat
criminal and noncriminal misconduct by youth.
The Supreme Court's decision In re Gault1 in 1967,
however, began transforming the juvenile court into a very
different institution than the Progressives contemplated.2
Progressives envisioned an informal court whose dispositions
reflected the "best interests" of the child. In Gault, the
Supreme Court engrafted formal trial procedures onto the ju-
venile court's individualized treatment sentencing scheme.
Although the Court did not intend to alter the juvenile court's
therapeutic mission, in the past two decades, legislative, judi-
cial, and administrative responses to Gault have modified the
court's jurisdiction, purpose, and procedures. As a result, juve-
* Centennial Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. This Essay
was originally presented as the inaugural lecture for Centennial Professor of
Law on September 24, 1990. I am very grateful to Dean Robert Stein and the
many generous alumni and donors for the privilege and honor of being named
the first Centennial Professor of Law.
I have received a great deal of professional and personal assistance
throughout my career. For the past decade, Bob Stein has been unstinting in
his support and encouragement. Many colleagues have generously given their
time, energy, and insights to improve my work. Finally, words cannot express
my gratitude to my wife, Patricia, for her unconditional love, which provides a
source of strength and security. I dedicate this Essay to my children, Ari and
Julia, with hope for the future of all young people.
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. See Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for Ju-
venile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 141-64 (1984); see also D. ROTHMAN, CON-
SCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN
PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 205 (1980); E. RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS:
AMERICA'S JuVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT 148-62 (1978).
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nile courts now converge procedurally and substantively with
adult criminal courts. 3
Three types of reforms - jurisdictional, jurisprudential,
and procedural - provide a vehicle for examining the contem-
porary juvenile court. The Supreme Court's recognition that
juvenile courts often failed to realize their benevolent purposes
has led to two jurisdictional changes. Status offenses are juve-
nile misconduct, such as truancy or incorrigibility, which would
not be crimes if committed by adults. Recent reforms limit the
dispositions that noncriminal offenders may receive or even re-
move status offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction. A second
jurisdictional change is the criminalizing of serious juvenile of-
fenders. Increasingly, courts and legislatures transfer some
youths from juvenile courts to criminal courts for prosecution
as adults.4 As jurisdiction contracts with the removal of serious
offenders and noncriminal status offenders, the sentences that
delinquents charged with crimes receive are now based on the
idea of just deserts rather than the child's "real needs." Pro-
portional and determinate sentences based on the present of-
fense and prior record, rather than the "best interests" of the
child, dictate the length, location, and intensity of interven-
tion.5 As punishment assumes a greater role in sentencing
juveniles, issues of procedural justice emerge. Although theo-
retically, juvenile courts' procedural safeguards closely resem-
ble those of criminal courts, in reality, the justice routinely
afforded juveniles is lower than the minimum insisted upon for
adults.
The substantive and procedural convergence between juve-
nile and criminal courts eliminates virtually all of the differ-
3. See generally Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense:
Punishmen Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U.L. REV. 821
(1988) [hereinafter Feld, Punishment Treatment]; Feld, supra note 2, at 169-
276. For information on the convergence of juvenile and criminal courts in
Minnesota, see Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform and the Serious
Young Offender: Dismantling the Rehabilitative Ideal, 65 MiNN. L. REv. 167,
241-42 (1981) [hereinafter Feld, Dismantling the Rehabilitative Ideal].
4. Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases: Reflections on Teen-Aged Axe-Mur-
derers, Judicial Activism, and Legislative Default, 8 LAW & INEQUALITY 1, 11
(1990) [hereinafter Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases]; Feld, Dismantling the
Rehabilitative Ideal, supra note 3, at 241-42; Feld, Juvenile Court Meets the
Principle of Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J.
CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 503-19 (1987) [hereinafter Feld, Legislative
Changes]; Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution" The
Legislative Alternative to Asking Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. REV.
515 (1978).
5. Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 3, at 832-38.
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ences in strategies of social control between youths and adults.
As a result, no reason remains to maintain a separate juvenile
court whose only distinction is its persisting procedural defi-
ciencies. Yet, even with the juvenile court's transformation
from an informal, rehabilitative agency into a scaled-down
criminal court, it continues to operate virtually unreformed.
The juvenile court's continued existence despite these changes
reflects an ambivalence about children and their control, and
provides an opportunity to re-examine basic assumptions about
the nature and competence of young people.
A. THE PROGRESSIVE JUVENmLE
COURT - PROCEDURAL INFORmALITY AND
INDIVIDUALIZED, OFFENDER-ORIENTED DISPOSITIONS
By the end of the nineteenth century, America changed
from a rural, agrarian society to an urban, industrial one.
6
Modernization, urbanization, and immigration posed many so-
cial problems and a reform movement, the Progressives,
emerged to address them.7 Progressives believed that benevo-
lent state action guided by experts could alleviate social ills;
they created agencies to inculcate their middle-class values and
to assimilate and "Americanize" immigrants and the poor to be-
come virtuous citizens like themselves.
1. Changing Conception of Children
Changes in family structure and functions accompanied the
economic transformation: Families became more private, wo-
men's roles more domestic, and a view of childhood and adoles-
cence as distinct developmental stages emerged.8 Before the
6. See generally G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERvATISM: A REINTER-
PRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY 1900-1916, at 11-56 (1963); R. WIEBE, THE
SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920, at 11-75 (1967); J. WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE
IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE 1900-1918, at 3-39 (1968).
7. See, e.g., S. HAYS, THE RESPONSE To INDUSTRIALISM 1885-1914, at 72-93
(1957); R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BYRAN TO F.D.R. 94-130
(1955).
8. For information on the evolution of the American family, particularly
the roles of women and children, see generally AMERICAN CHILDHOOD (J.
Hawes & N. Hiner eds. 1985); P. ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD 404 (1962);
J. KETT, RITES OF PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA 1790 TO THE PRESENT
(1977); C. LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD 6-10 (1977); S. RoTEmAN,
WOMAN'S PROPER PLACE: A HISTORY OF CHANGING IDEALS AND PRACTICES,
1870 TO THE PRESENT (1978); E. SHORTER, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN FAM-
ILY 22-54, 168-269 (1975); TURNING POINTS: HISTORICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ES-
SAYS ON THE FAMILY (J. Demos & S. Boocock eds. 1978); B. WISHY, THE CHILD
1991]
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past two or three centuries, age was neither the basis for a sep-
arate legal status nor for social segregation. Young people were
regarded as miniature adults, small versions of their parents.
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, children in-
creasingly were seen as vulnerable, innocent, passive, and de-
pendent beings who needed extended preparation for life. The
newer view of children altered traditional child-rearing prac-
tices and imposed a greater responsibility on parents to super-
vise their children's moral and social development. Many
Progressive reform programs shared a child-centered theme;
the juvenile court, child labor and welfare laws, and compul-
sory school attendance laws reflected and advanced the chang-
ing imagery of childhood.9
2. Changing Strategies of Social Control
Changes in ideological assumptions about the causes of
crime inspired many Progressive criminal justice reforms.
Although classical criminal law attributed crime to free-willed
actors, positivist criminology regarded crime as determined
rather than chosen. Criminology's attempt to identify the ante-
cedent causes of criminal behavior reduced the actors' moral re-
sponsibility and focused 'on reforming offenders rather than
punishing them for their offenses.10 Applying medical analo-
gies to the treatment of offenders, a growing class of social sci-
ence professionals fostered the rehabilitative ideal.1 '
Whether their movement was in fact a humanitarian one to
save poor and immigrant children 2 or intended to expand so-
AND THE REPUBLIC 115-35, 180-81 (1968); deMause, The Evolution of Childhood,
in THE HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD 1, 51-54 (L. deMause ed. 1974).
9. See, e.g., L. CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL: PROGRES-
SiSM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 1876-1957, at 127-28 (1961); J. KETT, supra
note 8, at 221-27; S. TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE RE-
FORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 14-33 (1982); W. TRATTNER, CRUSADE FOR THE
CHILDREN: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CHILD LABOR COMMITTEE AND
CHILD LABOR REFORM IN AMERICA 45-47 (1970); R. WIEBE, supra note 6, at 169.
10. F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 11-15 (1981); D.
MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 5-7 (1964); D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 50;
Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal in American Criminal Justice,
27 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 147, 151-53 (1978) [hereinafter Allen, American Criminal
Justice]; Allen, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in THE BORDER-
LAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25-28 (1964) [hereinafter Allen, Rehabilitative
Ideal].
11. E. RYERSON, supra note 2, at 99-100; Allen, American Criminal Jus-
tice, supra note 10, at 154.
12. J. SUTTON, STUBBORN CHILDREN: CONTROLLING DELINQUENCY IN THE
UNITED STATES 1640-1981, at 122 (1988); Hagan & Leon, Rediscovering Delin-
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cial control over them,'3 progressive "child-savers" described
juvenile courts as benign, nonpunitive, and therapeutic.
Progressives viewed youthful autonomy as malign; juvenile
court jurisdiction over unruly children reinforced parental au-
thority and allowed state intervention when parents were inad-
equate for the task.14 The legal doctrine of parens patriae, the
State as parent, legitimated intervention. Juvenile court per-
sonnel used informal, discretionary procedures to diagnose the
causes of and prescribe the cures for delinquency. By separat-
ing children from adults and providing a rehabilitative alterna-
tive to punishment, juvenile courts rejected the jurisprudence
of criminal law and its procedural safeguards, such as juries and
lawyers. Because the court's jurisdiction encompassed youths
suffering from abuse, dependency, or neglect, as well as those
charged with criminal offenses and noncriminal disobedience,
proceedings were characterized as civil rather than criminal.
Theoretically, a child's "best interests," background, and wel-
fare guided dispositions. Because a youth's offense was only a
symptom of her "real" needs, sentences were indeterminate,
nonproportional, and potentially continued for the duration of
minority.
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOMESTICATION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT - PROCEDURAL FORMALITY AND
INDIVIDUALIZED OFFENDER-ORIENTED DISPOSITIONS
The Supreme Court's Gault decision mandated procedural
safeguards in delinquency proceedings and focused initial judi-
cial attention on whether the child committed an offense as a
prerequisite to sentencing.15 In shifting the formal focus of ju-
venile courts from "real needs" to legal guilt, Gault identified
two crucial disjunctions between juvenile justice rhetoric and
reality: the theory versus practice of rehabilitation, and the dif-
ferences between the procedural safeguards afforded adults and
those available to juveniles.
In several later decisions, the Court required delinquency
to be proved by the criminal standard "beyond a reasonable
doubt" rather than by lower civil standards of proof,16 applied
quency: Social History, Political Ideology and the Sociology of Law, 42 AM.
Soc. REV. 587, 597 (1977).
13. A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS 75-83, 135 (2d ed. 1977); Fox, Juvenile
Justice Reform. An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1187, 1218 (1970).
14. A. PLATr, supra note 13, at 135; J. SUTrrroN, supra note 12, at 135.
15. Feld, Punishmen4 Treatment, supra note 3, at 826.
16. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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the ban on double jeopardy to delinquency convictions, 1'7 and
posited a functional equivalence between criminal trials and de-
linquency proceedings.
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,'8 however, the Supreme
Court denied juveniles the constitutional right to jury trials and
halted the extension of full procedural parity with adult crimi-
nal prosecutions. The Court feared that jury trials would ad-
versely affect traditional informality, render juvenile courts
procedurally indistinguishable from criminal courts, and call
into question the need for a separate juvenile court.19 The
McKeiver Court justified the procedural differences between
juvenile and criminal courts on the basis of the former's treat-
ment rationale and the latter's punitive purposes, although it
did not analyze the differences between treatment and punish-
ment that warranted the differences in procedural safeguards.
20
II. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT
Since those decisions, legislative, judicial, and administra-
tive actions have transformed the juvenile court. Four develop-
ments - removal of status offenders, waiver of serious
offenders to the adult system, increased punitiveness in sen-
tencing delinquents, and more formal procedures - provide
the impetus for criminalizing the juvenile court. Because these
reforms have not been implemented as intended and have not
had their expected effects, the juvenile court has been trans-
formed but remains unreformed.
A. JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION OVER NONCRIMINAL
STATUS OFFENDERS
The historical changes in normative assumptions about the
nature of children and the social control of youth resulted in
juvenile court jurisdiction over status offenses.21 Status juris-
diction allowed intervention to prevent predelinquent miscon-
duct such as disobedience or immorality from escalating into
full-blown criminality.
Although helping troubled children is inherently attrac-
tive, the definition and administration of status jurisdiction has
17. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
18. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
19. Id at 550-51.
20. Feld, Punishmen Treatment, supra note 3, at 832-33.
21. J. KErr, supra note 8, at 256; Fox, supra note 13, at 207-08.
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been criticized extensively in the post-Gault decades.22 Begin-
ning with the 1967 President's Crime Commission, many pro-
fessional organizations have advocated reform of status
jurisdiction.2 3 Critics focused on its adverse impact on children,
its disabling effects on families, schools, and other agencies that
refer status offenders to juvenile courts, and the legal and ad-
ministrative issues it raises for juvenile courts.
Prior to recent reforms, status offenses were a form of de-
linquency; status delinquents were detained and incarcerated in
the same institutions as criminal delinquents even though they
had committed no crimes.2 Parental referrals overloaded juve-
nile courts with intractable family disputes, diverted scarce ju-
dicial resources from other tasks, and exacerbated rather than
ameliorated family conflict. Social agencies and schools used
the court as a "dumping ground" to impose solutions instead of
addressing the sources of conflict. Judges enjoyed broad discre-
tion to prevent unruliness or immorality from ripening into
crime, and intervention often reflected their values and
prejudices. The exercise of standardless discretion had a dis-
proportionate impact on poor, minority, and female juveniles,23
and raised legal issues of "void for vagueness," equal protection,
and procedural justice.26
Three recent trends - diversion, deinstitutionalization,
and decriminalization - reflect judicial and legislative disillu-
sionment with the courts' treatment of noncriminal youths and
subsequent efforts to respond to these criticisms. The Federal
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 re-
22. For information on treatment of status offense by juvenile courts, see
generally BEYOND CONTROL: STATUS OFFENDERS IN THE JUVENILE COURT (L.
Teitelbaum & A. Gough eds. 1977) [hereinafter BEYOND CONTROL]; STATUS OF-
FENDERS AND THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (R. Allinson ed. 1983).
23. See, e.g., T. RUBIN, JUVENILE JUSTICE 56-58 (2nd ed. 1985) (reform pro-
posals included abolishing status jurisdiction entirely; separating noncriminal
from delinquent youths; prohibiting the detention and incarceration of status
offenders with criminal delinquents; and limiting the scope of intervention).
24. I. ScHwARTz, (IN)JUsTICE FOR JUVENIES 4 (1989).
25. Chesney-Lind, Girls and Status Offenses: Is Juvenile Justice Still Sex-
ist?, 20 CRiM. JUST. ABSTRACTS 144, 151-53 (1988); Sussman, Sex-Based Dis-
crimination and the PINS Jurisdiction, in BEYOND CONTROL, supra note 22, at
180-86.
26. See S.S. v. State, 299 A.2d 560, 568 (Me. 1973) (holding that a Maine
statute providing juvenile court jurisdiction over youths "living in circum-
stances of manifest danger of falling into habits of vice or immorality" was un-
constitutionally vague); E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Tex. Civ. App.
1969) (upholding the constitutionality of a Texas statute giving the juvenile
court jurisdiction over a youth who "habitually so deports himself as to injure
or endanger the morals of himself or others"); T. RUnIN, supra note 23, at 62.
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quired states to begin a process of removing noncriminal of-
fenders from secure detention and correctional facilities.2 The
federal and state28 restrictions on commingling status and de-
linquent offenders in secure institutions provided the impetus
to divert some status offenders from juvenile courts and de-
carcerate those who remained in the system.29
1. Diversion
Since Gault, virtually every state has redefined its status
jurisdiction. One strategy focuses on providing services on an
informal basis through diversion programs.30 Just as the origi-
nal juvenile court diverted youths from adult criminal courts,
now diversion shifts away from juvenile court youths who
would otherwise enter that system. It is questionable whether
diversion programs have been implemented coherently or have
been effective when attempted.3 ' Theoretically intended to re-
duce the court's client population, diversion has had the oppo-
site effect of "widening the net of social control. ' 32 The
number of juveniles referred to court remains relatively con-
stant despite a declining youth population, while juveniles who
previously would have been released now are subjected to other
forms of intervention. Diversion provides a rationale for shift-
ing discretion from the core of the juvenile court where it is
subject to a modicum of procedural formality, to its periphery,




The federal and state bans on commingling status and de-
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5778 (1988) (removal of status offenders from juve-
nile justice system).
28. In re Ellery C. v. Redlich, 32 N.Y.2d 588, 591, 300 N.E.2d 424, 425, 347
N.Y.S.2d 51, 53 (1973) (cannot confine status offenders in same institutions
with delinquents); see, e.g., State ex rel Harris v. Calendine, 160 W. Va. 172,
181, 233 S.E.2d 318, 321 (1977) (removal of status offenders from institutions).
29. Klein, Deinstitutionalization and Diversion of Juvenile Offenders: A
Litany of Impediments, 1 CRIME & JUST.: ANN. REv. 145, 146 (1979).
30. Id. at 150.
31. Id. at 157.
32. Id. at 184; Polk, Juvenile Diversion: A Look at the Record, 30 CRIME &
DELINQ. 648, 651 (1984).
33. Effectively, diversion "sanctified and encouraged a strategy for cir-
cumventing due process, assured that programs would stay in the discretionary
hands of local officials, and encouraged the privatization of long-term social
control." J. SurrON, supra note 12, at 215.
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linquent offenders in secure institutional confinement led to
the decarceration of noncriminal youths. Although the num-
bers of status offenders in secure facilities declined somewhat
by the mid-1980s, only a small proportion of status offenders
ever were sent to secure institutions and most remain eligible
for commitment to "forestry camps" and other medium secur-
ity facilities, albeit with fewer procedural rights than those af-
forded delinquents. Furthermore, 1980 amendments to the
Federal Juvenile Justice Act weakened even the restrictions on
secure confinement; status offenders who ran away from non-
secure placements or violated valid court orders may be
charged with contempt of court, a delinquent act, and incarcer-
ated.1 Many courts now charge juveniles with minor criminal
offenses instead of status offenses, for which there are no dispo-
sitional limits.
3. Decriminalization
Historically, status offenses were classified as a form of de-
linquency. Now, almost every state has separated conduct that
is only illegal for children - incorrigibility, runaway, truancy
- into new nondelinquency classifications such as Persons or
Children in Need of Supervision (PINS/CHINS).35 Such label
changes simply shift youths from one jurisdictional category to
another without significantly limiting courts' authority. Using
a label of convenience, former status offenders may be re-
labeled downward as dependent or neglected youths, upward as
delinquent offenders, or laterally into the private sector.36
Many former status offenders, especially those who are
middle-class and female, now are shifted into the private
mental health or chemical dependency treatment systems by
diversion, court referral, or voluntary parental commitment.3 7
The Supreme Court in Parham v. J.R 38 ruled that the only
process due to juveniles when parents commit them to secure
treatment facilities is a physician's determination that it is med-
ically appropriate. 39 Although some children's psychological
34. Juvenile Justice Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-509 § 11(a)(13),
94 Stat. 2750, 2757 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12)(A) (1988)). See Com-
ment, The Federal Circle Game: The Precarious Constitutional Status of Sta-
tus Offenders, 7 CoorEY L. REv. 31, 33 (1990).
35. T. RUBIN, supra note 23, at 57.
36. Klein, supra note 29, at 183.
37. I. SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at 131.
38. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
39. Id. at 607.
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dysfunctions or substance abuse require medical attention,
many commitments result from status-like social or behavioral
conflicts, self-serving parental motives, and medical entrepre-
neurs coping with underutilized hospitals. With no meaningful
judicial supervision, insurance coverage for inpatient mental
health care, and malleable diagnostic categories, medicalizing
deviance and incarcerating troublesome children is attractive.4°
Data on commitments to private psychiatric facilities indicate
that the number of juveniles entering the "hidden system" of
social control has increased dramatically as the confinement of
status offenders and nuisance juveniles has declined.41 Efforts
to deinstitutionalize inadvertently have resulted in "transinsti-
tutionalization," as some juveniles are transferred from pub-
licly funded facilities to private institutions. Whether
incarceration is for their "best interests," for "adjustment reac-
tions" symptomatic of adolescence, or for "chemical depen-
dency," these trends revive the imagery of diagnosis and
treatment on a discretionary basis without regard to formal due
process considerations.
The appropriate response to minor, nuisance, and noncrim-
inal youngsters goes to the heart of the juvenile court's mission
and the normative concept of childhood upon which it is based.
The debate polarizes advocates of authority and control of
youth and those who view intervention as discriminatory and a
denial of rights.4 Although a few states have eliminated status
jurisdiction entirely and allow noncriminal intervention only in
cases of dependency or neglect, juvenile court judges strongly
resist jurisdictional divestiture, because any contraction of their
authority over children leads to further convergence with crim-
inal courts. 43
B. SENTENCING JUVENILES
Historically, juvenile court sentences were discretionary,
indeterminate, and nonproportional to achieve the offender's
"best interests." The post-Gault era has witnessed a fundamen-
tal change in the jurisprudence of sentencing as considerations
of the offense, rather than the offender, dominate the decision.
40. Weithorn, Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth: An Analysis
of Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 773, 808 (1988); see also
Schwartz, Jackson-Beeck & Anderson, The Hidden System of Juvenile Con-
trol, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 371 (1984) (describing this trend in Minnesota).
41. I. SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at 136.
42. T. RUBIN, supra note 23, at 58.
43. Klein, supra note 29, at 172.
[Vol. 75:691
JUVENILE SENTENCING
A shift in sentencing philosophy from rehabilitation to retribu-
tion is evident both in the response to serious juvenile offend-
ers and in the routine sentencing of delinquent offenders.
1. Waiver of Juvenile Offenders to Criminal Court
Whether persistent or violent young offenders should be
sentenced as juveniles or adults poses difficult theoretical and
practical problems. Relinquishing juvenile court jurisdiction
over a youth represents a choice between sentencing in nomi-
nally rehabilitative juvenile courts or in punitive adult criminal
courts. The decision implicates both juvenile court sentencing
practices and the relationship between juvenile and adult court
sentencing practices. Virtually every state has a mechanism for
prosecuting some chronological juveniles as adults." While nu-
merically few, these youths challenge juvenile courts' rehabili-
tative assumptions and the appropriateness of nonpunitive,
short-term social control. David Brom, the sixteen-year-old
axe-murderer from Rochester, Minnesota, dramatically illus-
trated the problems.45
Two types of statutes, judicial waiver and legislative of-
fense exclusion, highlight the differences between juvenile and
criminal courts' sentencing philosophies.46 Because juvenile
courts emphasize individualized treatment of offenders, with
judicial waiver a judge may transfer jurisdiction on a discretion-
ary basis after a hearing to determine whether a youth is ame-
nable to treatment or a threat to public safety. With legislative
offense exclusion, by statutory definition, youths charged with
certain offenses simply are not within juvenile court
jurisdiction.
Judicial waiver's focus on the offender and legislative ex-
clusion's focus on the offense illustrate the contradictions be-
tween treatment and punishment. Conceptually, rehabilitation
and retribution are mutually exclusive penal goals. Punish-
ment is retrospective and imposes unpleasant consequences for
past offenses, while therapy is prospective and seeks to improve
44. Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases, supra note 4, at 4; Feld, Legislative
Changes, supra note 4, at 472; Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders for Adult
Prosecution" The Legislative Alternative to Asking Unanswerable Questions,
62 MINN. L. REV. 515, 516 (1978) [hereinafter Feld, Reference of Juvenile
Offenders].
45. See Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases, supra note 4, at 4.
46. Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 4, at 472; Thomas & Bilchik,
Prosecuting Juveniles in Criminal Courts: A Legal and Empirical Analysis,
76 J. CalM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 439, 457 (1985).
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offenders' future welfare. 47 Sentences based on the offense are
typically determinate and proportional, 48 while sentences based
on the offender are nonproportional and indeterminate.49
When youths are transferred to criminal court, legislative ex-
clusion uses the seriousness of the offense to control the adult-
hood decision whereas judicial waiver relies upon clinical
assessments of amenability to treatment or dangerousness to
decide.
Viewed this way, waiver statutes present the same issues
that indeterminate or determinate sentencing guidelines for
adults raise. In the adult context, determinate sentences based
on just deserts provide an alternative sentencing rationale to
indeterminate sentences.50 Just deserts sentencing emphasizes
equality, uses offense and prior record to define similar cases,
and precludes consideration of individual status or circum-
stance.51 By contrast, individualized justice includes all per-
sonal characteristics as relevant and relies heavily on
professional discretion to weigh each factor.52 Proponents of
just deserts reject individualization because treatment pro-
grams are ineffective,53 individualization vests broad discretion
in presumed experts who cannot justify treating similarly-situ-
ated offenders differently, and clinical subjectivity often pro-
duces unequal and unjust results.5
The just deserts sentencing philosophy has influenced sev-
47. Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 3, at 832; Gardner, Punish-
ment and Juvenile Justice: A Conceptual Framework for Assessing Constitu-
tional Rights of Youthful Offenders, 35 VAND. L. REV. 791, 815 (1982).
48. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIM[INAL SANCTION 139-45 (1968);
TwENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND
CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 19 (1976); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 98 (1976)
[hereinafter A. VON HIRSCH, JUSTICE]; A. VON HRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE
CRIMES 31-46 (1985) [hereinafter A. VON HIRSCH, CRIMES].
49. A. VON HIRSCH, CRIMES, supra note 48, at 39.
50. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 145 (1971);
A. VON HIRSCH, JUSTICE, supra note 48, at 102; Petersilia & Turner, Guideline-
based Justice: Prediction and Racial Minorities, 9 CRIME & JUST.: ANN. REV.
151, 155 (1987).
51. D. MATZA, supra note 10, at 113-14.
52. Id. at 114-15.
53. Lab & Whitehead, An Analysis of Juvenile Correctional Treatment, 34
CRIME & DELINQ. 60, 61 (1988); Martinson, What Works? Questions and An-
swers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INTEREST 22, 47 (1974).
54. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 50, at 124; A. -VON
HIRSCH, JUSTICE, supra note 48, at 27; A. VON HIRSCH, CRIMES, supra note 48,
at 5; Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 3, at 832; Feld, Bad Law Makes
Hard Cases, supra note 4, at 15.
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eral states' juvenile waiver and sentencing statutes.5 5 As a cri-
tique of discretionary judicial waiver, proponents of just deserts
contend that judges cannot validly or reliably predict clinically
whether a youth will be amenable to treatment or dangerous
and that the standardless discretion they exercise results in in-
consistent and discriminatory applications.56
a. Judicial Waiver
Judicial waiver embodies the juvenile court's approach to
individualized sentencing. Although two Supreme Court deci-
sions formalized waiver procedures,57 the substantive bases of
the waiver decision pose the principal difficulties. Asking a
judge to decide whether a youth is amenable or dangerous in-
volves fundamental questions of criminal and juvenile jurispru-
dence.58 Although the Progressives assumed that juveniles are
especially amenable to treatment, the question of "what works"
- whether rehabilitation programs systematically produce last-
ing change - remains highly controverted. Evaluation re-
search counsels skepticism about the availability of programs
that consistently or systematically rehabilitate adult or serious
juvenile offenders. The general conclusion that "nothing
works" in juvenile or adult corrections has not been persua-
sively refuted.59 Clearly, some offenders do persist in crime de-
spite treatment and valid and reliable clinical tools are lacking
with which to predict whether a particular individual will be a
recidivist. Similarly, asking a judge to decide whether a youth
poses a threat to public safety requires judges to predict future
55. Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 4, at 487; Feld, Punishmen
Treatment, supra note 3, at 821-22. See generally D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2
(describing state waiver and sentencing statutes).
56. Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 4, at 486; Feld, Reference of Ju-
venile Offenders, supra note 44, at 534; see also D. FOGEL, WE ARE THE LIVING
PROOF (1975) (arguing in favor of just deserts).
57. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (prohibition against double
jeopardy requires states to decide whether to proceed against a youth as a ju-
venile or as an adult before reaching the merits of the case); Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 542-43 (1966) (due process safeguards in waiver hearings).
58. Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 4, at 491; Feld, Reference of Ju-
venile Offenders, supra note 44, at 529.
59. See 8 CORREcTIONS AND PUNISHMENT 140 (D. Greenberg ed. 1977); L.
SECHREsT, S. WHITE & E. BROWN, THE PHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFEND-
ERs 50-51 (1979) [hereinafter L. SECHREST, S. WHIrE]; Lab & Whitehead, An
Analysis of Juvenile Correctional Treatment, 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 60, 77
(1988); Martinson, supra note 53, at 49; Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: To-
ward a New Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L. REV. 146, 161 n.84 (1989) (quoting L.
SECHREST, S. WHITE, supra, at 50-51).
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dangerousness even though the technical capacity to clinically
predict future criminal behavior is lacking.6°
Legislation that focuses on amenability or dangerousness
makes the dubious assumptions that there are effective treat-
ment programs for at least some serious or persistent juvenile
offenders, that clinical tools exist with which to diagnose a par-
ticular youth's treatment potential or threat, and that judges
can differentiate among various juveniles.6 Effectively, judicial
waiver statutes give judges broad, standardless discretion.62
Although some legislation includes lists of amorphous, subjec-
tive, and contradictory factors,6 3 those lists do not guide discre-
tion but rather reinforce it by allowing judges selectively to
emphasize one factor or another to justify any decision.6
Like individualized sentencing, the subjectivity of waiver
decisions produces inequities and disparities. Judges cannot ad-
minister discretionary statutes on an evenhanded basis. Within
a single jurisdiction, "justice by geography" prevails as courts
interpret and apply the same law inconsistently.r5 National
evaluations of judicial waiver provide compelling evidence that
it is arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory.6 A youth's race,
as well as geographic locale, affects waiver decisions.6 7 Idiosyn-
cratic differences in judicial philosophy or the location of the
hearing are more important than the nature of the crime. In
60. N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRmONMENT 62 (1974).
61. Feld, Delinquent Careers and Criminal Policy: Just Deserts and the
Waiver Decision, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 195, 198 (1983) [hereinafter Feld, Delin-
quent Careers]; Feld, Dismantling the Rehabilitative Ideal, supra note 3, at
179.
62. Such legislation is the juvenile equivalent of the capital punishment
statutes condemned by the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
240 (1972).
63. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966); Zimring, Notes To-
ward a Jurisprudence of Waiver, in MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE IN-
FORMATION AND TRAINING 195 (1982).
64. TwENTIET CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY To-
WARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUNG CRIME 56 (1978) [hereinafter
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE].
65. D. HAmPARIAN, L. ESTEP, S. MUNTEAN, R. PRIESTINO, R. SwIsHER, P.
WALLACE & J. WHITE, YOUTH IN ADULT COURTS 22 (1982) [hereinafter D.
HAMPARIAN, L. ESTEP]; Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases, supra note 4, at 25-
46; Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 4, at 492; Feld, Reference of Juvenile
Offenders, supra note 44, at 546.
66. D. HAMPARIAN, L. ESTEP, supra note 65, at 104.
67. Fagan, Forst & Vivona, Racial Determinants of the Judicial Transfer




short, judicial waiver exhibits all the characteristic defects of
discretionary sentencing.
Ultimately, waiver involves the appropriate disposition of
offenders who chronologically happen to be juveniles. The dis-
tinction between treatment as a juvenile and punishment as an
adult is based on an arbitrary line that has no criminological
significance other than its legal consequences. There is a strong
relationship between age and crime; crime rates for many of-
fenses peak in mid- to late-adolescence. 68 Rational sentencing
requires a coordinated response to young offenders on both
sides of the juvenile/adult line using a standardized means to
identify and sanction serious young criminals.69
Because young people are not irresponsible children one
day and responsible adults the next, except as a matter of law,
juvenile and adult courts pursue inconsistent sentencing goals.
A "punishment gap" occurs when juveniles make the transition
to criminal courts. Most juveniles judicially waived are charged
with property crimes like burglary, and not with serious of-
fenses against the person. When they appear in criminal courts
as adult first-offenders, typically they are not imprisoned.70 Be-
cause prior records cumulate, criminal courts sentence older of-
fenders more severely when their rate of criminal activity is
declining and sentence younger offenders more leniently even
68. Greenwood, Differences in Criminal Behavior and Court Responses
Among Juvenile and Young Adult Defendants, 7 CRIME & JUST.: ANN. REV.
151, 153-54 (1986); Petersilia, Criminal Career Research.- A Review of Recent
Evidence, 2 CRIME & JUST.: ANN. REv. 321, 358 (1980).
69. Chronic offenders are disproportionately involved in criminal activity,
committing their first offenses in their early to mid-teens, persisting in crimi-
nal activity into their twenties, and then gradually reducing their criminal in-
volvement. Greenwood, supra note 68, at 163.
70. P. GREENWOOD, J. PETERSIUA & F. ZndIMNG, AGE, CRIME, AND SANC-
TIONS: THE TRANSITION FROM JUVENILE TO ADULT COURT 32-39 (1980) [herein-
after P. GREENWOOD, J. PETERsILA]; D. HAMPARIAN, L. ESTEP, supra note 65,
at 112. But see P. GREENWOOD, A. ABRAHAMSE & F. ZIMRING, FACTORS AF-
FECTING SENTENCE SEVERITY FOR YOUNG ADULT OFFENDERS 56 (1984) (arguing
young adults are sentenced as severely as other offenders). The failure to in-
tervene most strongly in the lives of chronic and active young criminal offend-
ers occurs because of qualitative differences in the nature of juveniles'
offenses, differences between the criteria for juvenile court removal and crimi-
nal court sentences, and the failure to integrate juvenile and adult criminal
records for sentencing purposes. P. GREENWOOD, J. PETERSILIA, supra, at ix-
xii.
Even within comparable crime categories, age-related patterns of offend-
ing affect criminal sentencing. Young offenders are less likely than adults to




though they are at the peak of their criminal careers. 71
Although the differences between juvenile and adult
courts' sentencing practices work at cross-purposes when
youths make the transition, judicial waiver serves important
political and organizational functions for juvenile courts. By re-
linquishing a small fraction of its clientele and portraying these
juveniles as the most intractable and dangerous in the system,
juvenile courts create symbolic scapegoats, appear to protect
the public, preserve their jurisdiction over the vast bulk of
juveniles, and deflect more comprehensive criticisms.72
b. Legislative Exclusion of Offenses
In contrast to judicial waiver, legislative waiver simply ex-
cludes from juvenile court jurisdiction youths charged with cer-
tain offenses.73 Because legislatures create juvenile courts,
legislatures may modify the courts' jurisdictions as they please.
Legislatures often fail to make explicit their sentencing goals
when they require some youths to be prosecuted as adults.74
Defining adulthood entails a value choice about the quantity
and quality of crime that will be tolerated before punishment is
mandated.75 Exclusion could be justified if the minimum pe-
71. Boland, Fighting Crime: The Problem of Adolescents, 71 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 94, 96 (1980); Feld, Dismantling the Rehabilitative Ideal, supra
note 3, at 233-37.
72. Bortner, Traditional Rhetoric, Organizational Realities: Removal of
Juvenile to Adult Court, 32 CRImE & DELINQ. 53, 69-70 (1980); Feld, Legislative
Changes, supra note 4, at 493-94; Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra
note 44, at 546.
73. Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 4, at 494.
74. A legislature must recognize the sentencing goals it seeks in order to
translate jurisprudential criteria into waiver legislation. A legislature seeking
retribution could conclude that older youths who commit heinous offenses de-
serve to be treated as adults. A legislature seeking to selectively incapacitate
chronic offenders must emphasize cumulative persistence, however, because a
first offense, even if a serious one, does not provide a basis for distinguishing
between those who will or will not re-offend. D. HAMPARIAN, R. ScHUSTER, S.
DINrTz & J. CONRAD, THE VIOLENT FEw 102 (1978); M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO
& T. SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT 87-88 (1972) [hereinafter M.
WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO]. The most reliable indicator of the likelihood of future
criminality is the number of prior contacts a youth has with police and the
courts. Greenwood, supra note 68, at 164. Although most youths desist after
one or two contacts, the small group of chronic offenders continue to commit
delinquent acts. M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO, supra, at 88; Petersilia, supra note
68, at 369.
75. A legislature also needs to establish a minimum age for criminal lia-
bility for excluded offenders - sixteen, fifteen, or fourteen. At what age is it




riod of appropriate confinement exceeds the maximum sen-
tence available to a juvenile court.76 For example, sixteen-year-
old David Brom, convicted of four murders, could not be con-
fined "long enough" if sentenced as a juvenile.
Yet community protection is enhanced, deterrence in-
creased, and fundamental norms reaffirmed only if longer adult
sentences actually are imposed consistently. Using the present
offense and prior record to structure waiver decisions rather
than amorphous clinical considerations can integrate juvenile
and adult sentencing practices and enable criminal courts to
sentence violent or chronic juveniles more consistently.77
Within the past decade, just deserts rather than clinical as-
sessments has come to dominate this sentencing decision.78
Legislatures use offense criteria either as dispositional guide-
lines in judicial waiver to limit discretion and improve the fit
between waiver decisions and criminal court sentencing prac-
tices, or to automatically exclude certain youths.79 More than
twenty states have amended their judicial waiver statutes to re-
duce their inconsistency and to reconcile the contradictions be-
tween juvenile and adult sentencing practices.80 Some states
specify that only serious offenses such as murder, rape, or rob-
bery may be waived.8' Restricting waiver to serious offenses
There is no compelling or convincing evidence that persons aged six-
teen to eighteen differ significantly from persons aged eighteen and
over in their capacity to understand the outcomes and consequences
of their acts.... [S]erious crime should be treated seriously regardless
of the offender's age.
TWENTH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE, supra note 64, at 25 (Wolfgang,
dissenting).
76. As one commentator explained:
[T]he justification for waiver is singular* transfer to criminal court is
necessary when the maximum punishment available in juvenile court
is clearly inadequate .... [Tihe standard for making a -waiver deci-
sion is a determination that the maximum social control available in
juvenile court falls far short of the minimum social control necessary
if a particular offender is guilty of the serious crime he is charged
with.
Zimring, supra note 63, at 201.
77. Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases, supra note 4, at 96-99; Feld, Delin-
quent Careers, supra note 61, at 208-10; Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders,
supra note 44, at 572.
78. Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 4, at 487. See generally D. ROTH-
MAN, supra note 2 (describing the emergence of the just deserts sentencing
philosophy).
79. Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 4, at 504.
80. Id. at 508.
81. Legislatures also use offense criteria to modify waiver procedures,
making transfer hearings mandatory if one of the enumerated offenses is
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limits judicial discretion and increases the likelihood that sig-
nificant adult sanctions will be imposed if waiver is ordered.
More importantly, about half of the states have rejected, at
least in part, the juvenile court's individualized sentencing phi-
losophy, emphasized policies of retribution or incapacitation,
and excluded youths charged with serious offenses from juve-
nile court jurisdiction.8 2 Although some states only exclude
youths charged with capital crimes, murder, or offenses punish-
able by life imprisonment, others exclude longer lists of of-
fenses such as rape or armed robbery.83 Regardless of the
details, these statutes remove judicial sentencing discretion en-
tirely and base the decision to try a youth as an adult exclu-
sively on the offense. These statutes provide one indicator of
the shift from an individualized treatment sentencing philoso-
phy in juvenile court to a more retributive one, and reflect leg-
islative distrust of judges' exercises of discretion. Using
offenses to structure or eliminate judicial discretion repudiates
rehabilitation, narrows juvenile court jurisdiction, reduces its
clientele, and denies it the opportunity even to try to treat cer-
tain youths.
2. Punishment in Juvenile Courts - Offense-Based
Sentencing Practices
States apply principles of just deserts to the routine sen-
tencing of juveniles as well as to waiver.8 4 The McKeiver Court
rejected procedural equality between juveniles and adults be-
cause juvenile courts purportedly treated rather than punished
youths. Increasingly, however, juvenile courts pursue the sub-
stantive goals of criminal law.8 5 Courts and legislatures use of-
fense criteria to regulate sentencing because individualization
neither reduces recidivism nor provides a principled basis for
coercive intervention. Moreover, it produces unequal results
among similarly situated offenders and punishes minor offend-
ers excessively and serious ones leniently.86
alleged or shifting to the juvenile the burden of proof to establish his or her
amenability to treatment, rather than to require the state to prove
nonamenability. Id. at 508-09.
82. Id at 511.
83. Id. Still others exclude youths charged with repeat offenses, or sup-
plement judicial waiver provisions with offense exclusions.
84. Feld, Punishmen4 Treatment, supra note 3, at 832-96.
85. See id.
86. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERv. COMM., supra note 50, at 124-44; A. VON
HIRSCH, CRIMEs, supra note 48, at 171-74; A. VON HIRSCH, JUSTICE, supra note
48, at 29-32; Cohen, Juvenile Offenders: Proportionality vs. Treatment,
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An examination of legislative purpose clauses, juvenile
court sentencing statutes and actual sentencing practices, and
conditions of institutional confinement consistently reveals that
treating juveniles closely resembles punishing adult criminals.8 7
Punishing juveniles, however, has constitutional consequences,
because the McKeiver Court posited a therapeutic juvenile
court as the justification for its procedural differences.
a. The Purpose of the Juvenile Court
Forty-two states' juvenile codes contain a statement of leg-
islative purpose to aid courts in interpreting the legislation.8 8
Since the creation of the original juvenile court in 1899, the
traditional purpose has been "to secure for each minor... such
care and guidance . . . as will serve the moral, emotional,
mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best inter-
ests of the community."8 9 In the past decade, about one-quarter
of the states have redefined their courts' purposes.9° These
amendments de-emphasize rehabilitation and the child's "best
interests," and emphasize the importance of protecting public
safety,9 ' enforcing children's obligations to society,92 applying
sanctions consistent with the seriousness of the offense,93 and
rendering appropriate punishment to offenders.9 For example,
CHILDREN'S RTs. REP., May 1978, at 1, 2; Feld, Punishmen Treatment, supra
note 3, at 836 n.6.
87. Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 4, at 519; Feld, Punishmen
Treatment, supra note 3, at 889-91.
88. Feld, Punishmen Treatment, supra note 3, at 842 n.83 (listing
statutes).
89. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, 1 801-2 (Smith-Hurd 1990). Many juvenile
codes supplement that original statement of purpose with the additional goal
of removing "the taint of criminality and the penal consequences of criminal
behavior, by substituting therefore an individual program of counselling, su-
pervision, treatment, and rehabilitation." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:1 II
(Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01 (Anderson 1990); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 37-1-101 (1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 631 (1981).
90. Feld, Punishmen Treatment, supra note 3, at 842 n.84 (listing
statutes).
91. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202(a) (West Supp. 1990) ("provide for the
protection and safety of the public"); see also PRIVATE SECTOR TASK FORCE ON
JUVENILE JusTICE, FINAL REPORT iii (1987) [hereinafter PRIVATE SECTOR TASK
FORCE].
92. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-1-1 (Burns 1987) ("protect the public by enforc-
ing the legal obligations children have to society").
93. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.001(2)(a) (West 1988) ("protect society . . .
[while] recognizing that the application of sanctions which are consistent with
the seriousness of the offense is appropriate in all cases").
94. HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-1 (1985). See generally Walkover, The Infancy
Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REV. 503, 523-28 (1984).
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the purpose of Minnesota's juvenile courts now is "to promote
the public safety and reduce juvenile delinquency by maintain-
ing the integrity of the substantive law prohibiting certain be-
havior and by developing individual responsibility for lawful
behavior."9 5
Courts recognize that these changes in purpose clauses sig-
nal a basic philosophical reorientation, even as they approve
punishment in juvenile courts.9 The state of Washington
adopted a juvenile code that emphasizes just deserts rather
than treatment.9 7 Confronted with a request for a jury trial,
the Washington Supreme Court reasoned that sometimes pun-
ishment is treatment and held that "accountability for criminal
behavior, the prior criminal activity and punishment commen-
surate with age, crime and criminal history does as much to re-
habilitate ... an errant youth as does the prior philosophy of
focusing upon ... characteristics of the individual juvenile."98s
Similarly, the Nevada Supreme Court endorsed punishment,
stating that "[b]y formally recognizing the legitimacy of puni-
tive and deterrent sanctions for criminal offenses juvenile
courts will be properly and somewhat belatedly expressing soci-
ety's firm disapproval of juvenile crime and will be clearly issu-
ing a threat of punishment for criminal acts to the juvenile
population." 9 9
b. Just Deserts Dispositions - Legislative and
Administrative Changes in Juvenile Courts'
Sentencing Framework
Sentencing statutes provide another indicator of whether a
juvenile court is punishing or treating delinquents. Originally,
juvenile court sentences were indeterminate and nonpropor-
tional to achieve the child's "best interests." Although most ju-
venile sentencing statutes mirror their Progressive origins,
95. MINN. STAT. § 260.011(2)(c) (1990).
96. In re D.F.B., 430 N.W.2d 476, 478 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), aff'd, 433
N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1988); State ex rel. D.D.H. v. Dostert, 165 W. Va. 448, 456-59,
269 S.E.2d 401, 408-09 (1980).
97. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2) (Supp. 1990); see also Becker,
Washington State's New Juvenile Code: An Introduction, 14 GONZ. L. RrV.
289, 307-08 (1979) (part of symposium on the revised Washington juvenile
code); Feld, Dismantling the Rehabilitative Ideal, supra note 3, at 200-03;
Walkover, supra note 94, at 528-33.
98. State v. Lawley, 91 Wash. 2d 652, 656-57, 591 P.2d 772, 773 (1979); see
also State v. Schaaf, 109 Wash. 2d 1, 16-17, 743 P.2d 240, 247 (1987) (changes in
the Juvenile Justice Act did not require recognition of right to jury trial).
99. In re Seven Minors, 99 Nev. 427, 432, 664 P.2d 947, 950 (1983).
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even states that use indeterminate sentences emphasize the of-
fense as a dispositional constraint. Several states instruct
judges to consider the seriousness of the offense and the child's
culpability, age, and prior record when imposing a sentence.1c °
i. Determinate Sentences in Juvenile Court
Despite the court's history of indeterminate sentencing,
about one-third of the states now use the present offense and
prior record to regulate at least some sentencing decisions
through determinate or mandatory minimum sentencing stat-
utes or correctional administrative guidelines.10 1 The clearest
departure from traditional juvenile court sentencing practices
occurred in 1977 when Washington state enacted just deserts
legislation that based presumptive sentences on a youth's age,
present offense, and prior record.10 2 In New Jersey, juvenile
court judges consider offense, criminal history, and statutory
aggravating and mitigating factors when sentencing juveniles,
and enhance sentences for serious or repeat offenders. 0 3 Texas
uses determinate sentences for juveniles charged with serious
offenses.'14
ii. Mandatory Minimum Terms of Confinement Based on
Offense
Several states impose mandatory minimum sentences for
certain offenses such as "designated felonies."'1 5  Some
mandatory minimum statutes give judges discretion whether or
not to institutionalize a juvenile, and prescribe the minimum
term only if incarceration is ordered.106 Other mandatory mini-
mum sentencing statutes are nondiscretionary, and the court
100. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-646 (1989) ("appropriate to the seriousness
of the offense, the degree of culpability indicated by the circumstances of the
particular case and the age and prior record of the juvenile").
101. See Feld, Punishmen4 Treatment, supra note 3, at 850-62 (Table I and
discussion).
102. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
103. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-43(a) (West Supp. 1990).
104. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.04 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
105. E.g., Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.355 (Anderson 1990); N.Y. FAM. CT.
Acr §§ 301.2(8)-(9), 352.2, 353.5 (McKinney Supp. 1990). For a comprehensive
comparison of state juvenile codes, see Feld, Punishmen4 Treatment, supra
note 3, at 862-79 (Table I and discussion).
106. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-3-113, -113.1, -113.2 (1986); Ky. REV. STAT.




must commit the youth for the minimum period.107 Nondiscre-
tionary mandatory minimum terms apply for serious, violent,108
or repeated offenses.'09 These therapeutic sentencing laws are
addressed to "violent and repeat offenders," "aggravated juve-
nile offenders," "serious juvenile offenders," or "designated
felons."" 0 These statutes prescribe the level of security and
the length of confinement, which may range from twelve to
eighteen months,"'- to age twenty-one,1 2 or to the adult term
for the same offense." 3 Basing mandatory minimum sentences
on the offense precludes any individualized consideration of the
offender's "real needs."
iii. Administrative Sentencing and Parole Release
Guidelines
Another form of just deserts sentencing appears in the
adoption by several states' department of corrections of offense
guidelines to structure institutional confinement and release
decisions. While adult prison and parole authorities have used
guidelines for decades, their use for juveniles is more recent.
Minnesota's Department of Corrections adopted determinate
"length of stay" guidelines based on the present offense and
other "risk" factors. 114 The juvenile risk factors are the same
107. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 937 (Supp. 1988).
108. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, % 805-35 (Smith-Hurd 1990); N.Y. FAM. CT.
AcT §§ 301.2(8)-(9), 352.2, 353.5 (McKinney Supp. 1990).
109. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 937 (Supp. 1988).
110. Colorado uses special provisions for sentencing "violent" and "repeat
juvenile offenders," "mandatory sentence offenders," and "aggravated juvenile
offenders" that include mandatory minimum out of home placements. COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 19-3-113, -113.1, -113.2 (1986). "[S]erious juvenile offenders" in
Connecticut receive offense-based sentences which include mandatory mini-
mum out-of-home placement. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-141(a) (1989).
"[D]esignated felony" legislation in Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-37 (Supp.
1989), and New York, N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT §§ 301.2(8)-(9), 352.2, 353.5 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1990), prescribes the length of confinement and level of security for
juveniles convicted of enumerated offenses and includes provisions for non-
discretionary mandatory sentences. Seven other states impose mandatory
minimum sentences on serious or repeat juvenile offenders. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 937 (1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, 805-35 (Smith-Hurd 1990); Ky.
REV. STAT. § 208.194 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-
652(b)(2) (1987); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.355 (Anderson 1990); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-1-137 (Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-285.1 (Supp. 1990).
111. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-37 (Supp 1989).
112. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, 1 805-35 (Smith-Hurd 1990).
113. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208F.030 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982) (re-
pealed 1984).




as those used in Minnesota's Adult Sentencing Guidelines that
are designed to achieve just deserts." 5 Georgia" 6 and Ari-
zonam7 employ administrative guidelines that use offense cate-
gories to specify proportional mandatory minimum terms.
Juveniles committed to the California Youth Authority are re-
leased by a Parole Board that uses offense guidelines to estab-
lish release eligibility."18
c. Empirical Evaluations of Juvenile Court Sentencing
Practices
Juvenile court judges decide what to do with a child, in
part, by reference to statutory mandates. Practical bureau-
cratic considerations influence their decisions as well.119 Be-
cause of paternalistic assumptions about children and the need
to look beyond the present offense to their "best interests,"
judges enjoy greater discretion than do their adult-court
counterparts. 2 0
The exercise of broad discretion associated with individual-
ized justice raises concerns about its discriminatory impact.' 21
Poor and minority youths are disproportionately over-repre-
115. Feld, Punishmen Treatment, supra note 3, at 874; see MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 244 app. 1.2., II.B. (West Supp. 1991) (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
and Commentary).
116. M. FORST, E. FRIEDMAN & R. COATES, INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT
AND RELEASE DECISION-MIAKING FOR JUVENILE DELINQUENTS: AN ASSESS-
MENT OF DETERMINATE AND INDETERMINATE APPROACHES, GEORGIA - A CASE
STUDY 9-11 (URSA Inst. 1985).
117. ARIZONA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, LENGTH OF CONFINEMENT GUIDE-
LINES FOR JUVENILES (1986).
118. CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT PRACTICE § 10.14-.16 (1981) (outlining
parole guidelines based on the severity of offense).
119. See M. BORTNER, INSIDE A JUVENILE COURT 38-58 (1982); A. CICOUREL,
THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 292-327 (1968); R. EMERSON,
JUDGING DELINQUENTS 29-56 (1969).
120. See M. BORTNER, supra note 120, at 243 (discussing the broad sentenc-
ing discretion afforded juvenile court judges); Barton, Discretionary Decision-
Making in Juvenile Justice, 22 CRIME & DELiNQ. 470, 471 (1976) (discussing
the paternalistic assumptions underlying the juvenile court treatment ideal).
121. See Dannefer & Schutt, Race and Juvenile Justice Processing in Court
and Police Agencies, 87 AM. J. Soc. 1113, 1129-30 (1982); Fagan, Slaughter &
Hartstone, Blind Justice? The Impact of Race on the Juvenile Justice Process,
33 CRIME & DELINQ. 224, 250-51 (1987) [hereinafter Fagan, Slaughter]; Kris-
berg, Schwartz, Fishman, Eisikovits, Guttman & Joe, The Incarceration of Mi-
nority Youth, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 173, 200 (1987) [hereinafter Krisberg,
Schwartz]; McCarthy & Smith, The Conceptualization of Discrimination in
the Juvenile Justice Process: The Impact of Administrative Factors and
Screening Decisions on Juvenile Court Dispositions, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 41, 58
(1986); Pope & Feyerherm, Minority Status and Juvenile Justice Processing:
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sented in juvenile correctional institutions.122 Does basing dis-
cretionary sentences on social characteristics or race rather
than legal variables result in differential processing and more
severe sentencing of minority youths? 23 Or, despite the theo-
retical commitment to individualized justice, are sentences
based on offenses, and does the racial disproportionality result
from real differences in rates of offending by race?12A In short,
to what extent do legal, offense or social variables influence ju-
venile court judges' sentencing decisions?
Although evaluations of juvenile court sentencing practices
are sometimes contradictory,25 two general findings emerge.
First, the present offense and prior record account for most of
the variation in sentencing that can be explained.26 Second, af-
ter controlling for offense variables, individualized discretion is
often synonymous with racial disparities in sentencing12T
Practical bureaucratic considerations provide an impetus to
base sentences on the offense. The desire to avoid scandals and
unfavorable political and media attention constrains juvenile
court judges to impose more formal and restrictive sentences
An Assessment of the Research Literature (pt. 2), 22 Crm. JUST. ABSTRACTS
527, 528 (1990).
122. See Krisberg, Schwartz, supra note 121, at 174.
123. See id. at 200; Fagan, Slaughter, supra note 121, at 250; McCarthy &
Smith, supra note 121, at 58.
124. See M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO, supra note 74, at 248; Hindelang, Race
and Involvement in Common Law Personal Crimes, 43 AM. Soc. REV. 93, 103-
06 (1978). But see Huizinga & Elliott, Juvenile Offenders: Prevalence, Of-
fender Incidence, and Arrest Rates by Race, 33 CRIME & DEUNQ. 206, 221
(1987) (difference in incarceration rates cannot be explained by differing rates
of offending).
125. See Fagan, Slaughter, supra note 121, at 225; McCarthy & Smith,
supra note 121, at 41.
126. See Clarke & Koch, Juvenile Court" Therapy or Crime Control, and
Do Lawyers Make a Difference?, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 263, 276-86 (1980);
Horowitz & Wasserman, Some Misleading Conceptions in Sentencing Re-
search: An Example and Reformulation in the Juvenile Court, 18 CRIMINOL-
OGY 411, 416 (1980); McCarthy & Smith, supra note 121, at 52; see also Barton,
supra note 120, at 476-77 (prior record and present offense, second and first
most important dispositional criteria, respectively); Feld, The Right to Counsel
in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and the
Difference They Make, 79 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1224-32 (1989)
(past record and present offense have the highest correlations of any variables
with disposition decisions); Phillips & Dinitz, Labelling and Juvenile Court
Dispositions: Official Responses to a Cohort of Violent Juveniles, 23 Soc. Q.
267, 276 (1982) (same).
127. See Fagan, Slaughter, supra note 121, at 241-50; Krisberg, Schwartz,
supra note 121, at 194; McCarthy & Smith, supra note 121, at 53-61; Pope &
Feyerherm, supra note 121, at 528.
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on more serious delinquents.123 Moreover, organizations that
pursue contradictory goals must develop bureaucratic strategies
to simplify individualized assessments.129 Because juvenile
courts routinely collect information about present offenses and
prior records, such data provide bases for decisions. Despite
claims of individualization, juvenile and adult sentencing prac-
tices are more similar in their emphasis on present offense and
prior record than their statutory language suggests. 30
Although there is a relationship between offenses and dis-
positions, most of the variation in sentencing juveniles remains
unexplained.' 3 ' The recent statutory changes reflect legislative
disquiet with the underlying premises of individualized justice,
the idiosyncratic exercises of discretion, and the inequalities
that result. 3
2
d. Conditions of Juvenile Confinement
Another way to determine whether juvenile courts are
punishing or treating young offenders is to examine the correc-
tional facilities to which they are sent. It was the deplorable
conditions of confinement that motivated the Court in Gault to
insist upon minimal procedural safeguards for juveniles.'3
Since their inception, the reality of custodial institutions has
contradicted the juvenile court's rhetorical commitment to re-
habilitation. Historical studies of Progressive juvenile correc-
tional programs provide dismal accounts of training schools and
institutions that were scarcely distinguishable from their adult
penal counterparts134
128. See A. CIcoUREL, supra note 119, at 170-242; R. EMERSON, supra note
119, at 29-56; D. MATZA, supra note 10, at 120-23; Bortner, supra note 72, at 68-
71.
129. See D. MATZA, supra note 10, at 120-22; Marshall & Thomas, Discre-
tionary Decision-Making and the Juvenile Court, 34 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 47, 55-
56 (1983).
130. P. GREENWOOD, A. LIPSON, .A. ABRAHAMsE & F. ZIMRING, YouTm
CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA 51 (Rand Report No. 3016-CSA,
1983) [hereinafter P. GREENWOOD, A. LIPSoN].
131. See Horowitz & Wasserman, supra note 126, at 416; Thomas & Fitch,
An Inquiry Into the Association Between Respondents' Personal Characteris-
tics and Juvenile Court Dispositions, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 61, 75, 82 (1975).
132. See Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 4, at 487; Feld, Punishmen
Treatment, supra note 3, at 836, 852.
133. 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).
134. See D. RoTHMA, supra note 2, at 261-89; S. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND
THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF "PROGRESSIVE"
JUVENILE JUSTICE 1825-1920, at 81-123 (1977). The juvenile court's lineage of
punitive confinement in the name of rehabilitation can be traced to its institu-
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Inadequate correctional programs are not simply historical
artifacts. Contemporary evaluations of juvenile institutions re-
veal a continuing gap between rehabilitative rhetoric and puni-
tive reality.135 Research in Massachusetts describes violent and
punitive institutions in which staff physically abused inmates
and were frequently powerless to prevent inmate violence. 38
Several studies in other jurisdictions report similar staff and in-
mate violence, physical abuse, and degrading make-work. 137
The daily reality for juveniles confined in many so-called treat-
ment facilities is one of violence, predatory behavior, and puni-
tive incarceration.
Coinciding with these post-Gault evaluations, lawsuits chal-
lenged conditions of confinement, alleged that they violated in-
mates' "right to treatment" and inflicted "cruel and unusual
punishment," and provided another outside view of juvenile
corrections. 138 Federal judges found that staff routinely beat
juveniles with fraternity paddles, injected them with psycho-
tropic drugs for social control purposes, and deprived them of
minimally adequate care or individualized treatment.139 Other
courts found numerous instances of physical abuse, staff-admin-
istered beating and tear-gassing, homosexual assaults, extended
solitary confinement in dungeon-like cells, repetitive and de-
grading make-work, and minimal clinical services.140 Unfortu-
nately, these cases are not atypical, as the many decisions
tional precursor, the House of Refuge. See J. HAWES, CHILDREN IN URBAN SO-
CIEY: JUVENILE DELiNQUENCY IN 19TH CENTuRY AMERICA 27-60 (1971); R.
MENNEL, THORNS AND THISTLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTs IN THE UNITED
STATES 1825-1840, at 83, 86 (1973); D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASY-
LUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEw REPUBLIC 221-36 (1971).
135. See C. BARTOLLAS, S. MILLER & S. DINITz, JUVENILE VICTIMIZATION
17-31 (1976) [hereinafter C. BARTOLLAS, S. MILLER]; B. FELD, NEUTRALIZING
INMATE VIOLENCE 62-64 (1977); S. LERNER, BODILY HARM: THE PATTERN OF
FEAR AND VIOLENCE AT THE CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY 11-46 (1986); Feld,
A Comparative Analysis of Organizational Structure and Inmate Subcultures
in Institutes for Juvenile Offenders, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 336, 346-61 (1981).
136. See B. FELD, supra note 135, at 62-64; Feld, supra note 135, at 346-47,
361.
137. See C. BARTOLLAS, S. MILLER, supra note 135, at 33-47; Guggenheim, A
Call to Abolish the Juvenile Justice System, CHILDREN'S RTS. REP., June 1978,
at 6-8. A recent review of California Youth Authority (CYA) institutions con-
cluded that "a young man... cannot pay his debt to society safely. The hard
truth is that the CYA staff cannot protect its inmates from being beaten or
intimidated by other prisoners." S. LERNER, supra note 135, at 12.
138. Feld, supra note 2, at 142.
139. Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 354-60 (5th Cir. 1974).
140. Morales v. Turman, 535 F.2d 864, 867-69 (5th Cir. 1976); Inmates of
Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1358-65 (D.R.I. 1972).
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documenting inhumane conditions in juvenile institutions and
even adult jails where juveniles also are held demonstrate.141
Rehabilitative euphemisms such as "providing a structured en-
vironment" cannot disguise the punitive reality of juvenile con-
finement. Although juvenile institutions are not as uniformly
bad as adult prisons, the prevalence of violence, aggression, and
homosexual rape in juvenile facilities is hardly consoling.14
Evaluations of these rehabilitation programs provide scant sup-
port for their effectiveness. 143
3. Summary of Changes in Juvenile Court Sentencing
Practices
A strong, nationwide movement, both in theory and in
practice, is repudiating therapeutic, individualized dispositions
in favor of punitive sentences. When the Court decided McK-
eiver in 1971, no states used determinate or mandatory mini-
mum sentences or administrative guidelines. In the middle to
late 1970s, several states adopted "designated felony"'"1 and se-
rious offender' 45 laws and sentencing guidelines.146 Since 1980,
at least eleven more states have adopted determinate or
mandatory minimum sentence laws or administrative guide-
lines, so that now about one-third of the states explicitly use
punitive sentencing strategies.14 7 These formal changes and ac-
tual practices eliminate most of the differences between juve-
nile and adult sentencing. Imposing mandatory or determinate
sentences on the basis of offense and prior record contradicts
any therapeutic purposes and precludes consideration of a
youth's "real needs." Revised juvenile purpose clauses and
court decisions eliminate even rhetorical support for rehabilita-
tion. As a result, "the purposes of the juvenile process have be-
come more punitive, its procedures formalistic, adversarial and
public, and the consequences of conviction much more
141. Krisberg, Schwartz, Lisky & Austin, The Watershed of Juvenile Jus-
tice Reform, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 5, 30-36 (1986); Soler, Litigation on Behalf of
Children in Adult Jails, 34 CRIME & DELNQ. 190, 194-97 (1988).
142. C. BARTOLLAS, S. M.LER, supra note 135, at 73-83; B. FELD, supra
note 135, at 131-38.
143. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
144. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(8)-(9) (Consol. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 208.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988) (repealed 1989).
145. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 19-1-103(28), (23.5), (19.5), (2.1), 19-3-113, -113.1
(1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46B-141(a) (1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37 805-35
(1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-652(b)(1)-(2) (1989).
146. WASH. REV. CODE § 13A0.0357 (Supp. 1990).
147. Feld, Punishment Treatment, supra note 3, at 842-87.
1991]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
harsh. ' 148 All these changes repudiate the original assumptions
that juvenile courts operate in a child's "best interests," that
youths should be treated differently than adults, and that reha-
bilitation is an indeterminate process that cannot be limited by
fixed-time punishment.149
C. THE PROCEDURAL CONVERGENCE BETWEEN JUVENILE AND
CRIMINAL COURTS
These changes contradict the McKeiver Court's premise
that therapeutic juvenile dispositions require fewer procedural
safeguards and raise questions that the Court avoided about the
quality of justice. Since Gault, the formal procedures of juve-
nile and criminal courts have converged.150 There remains,
however, a substantial gulf between theory and reality, be-
tween the law on the books and the law in action. Theoreti-
cally, delinquents are entitled to formal trials and the
assistance of counsel. In actuality, the quality of procedural
justice is far different. More than two decades ago, the
Supreme Court decried that "the child receives the worst of
both worlds: . . . he gets neither the protections accorded to
adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postu-
lated for children."'151 Despite the criminalizing of juvenile
courts, most states provide neither special procedures to protect
juveniles from their own immaturity nor the full panoply of
adult procedural safeguards. Instead, states treat juveniles just
like adult criminal defendants when equality redounds to their
disadvantage and use less adequate juvenile court safeguards
when those deficient procedures provide an advantage to the
state.152
1. Jury Trials in Juvenile Court
The right to a jury trial and the assistance of counsel are
two critical procedural safeguards when sentences are punitive
rather than therapeutic. In denying juveniles a jury trial, the
148. In re Javier A., 159 Cal. App. 3d 913, 963-64, 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 421
(1984).
149. See R. COATES, M. FORST & B. FISHER, INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT
AND RELEASE DECISION-MAKING FOR JUVENILE DELINQUENTS: AN ASSESS-
MENT OF DETERMINATE AND INDETERMINATE APPROACHES - A CROSS STATE
ANALYSIS 1-3 (1985).
150. Feld, supra note 2, at 141-42; see Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An
Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1187, 1187-88 (1970).
151. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 596 (1966).
152. Feld, supra note 2, at 141-42.
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McKeiver Court posited virtual parity between the factual accu-
racy of juvenile and adult adjudications. But juries provide spe-
cial protections to ensure factual accuracy and acquit more
readily than do judges.1 53 Based on the same evidence, it is eas-
ier to convict a youth appearing before a judge in juvenile court
than it would be to convict before a jury in a criminal
proceeding. 154
Moreover, McKeiver simply ignored that constitutional
procedures also prevent governmental oppression. 5 5  In
Duncan v. Louisiana,156 the Court held that adult criminal pro-
ceedings required a jury to assure both factual accuracy and
protection against governmental oppression. Duncan empha-
sized that juries protect against a weak or biased judge, inject
the community's values into law, and increase the visibility and
accountability of justice administration. 157 These protective
functions are even more crucial in juvenile courts that labor be-
hind closed doors, immune from public scrutiny.
Few of the states that sentence juveniles punitively provide
jury trials; several have rejected constitutional challenges.158
Even in states where juries are available in the juvenile court,
their symbolic significance far outweighs their practical impact
because they are seldom used.15 9 As a symbol, the jury requires
candor and honesty about the punishment that is imposed in
the name of treatment and the need to protect against even be-
nevolent governmental coercion. Rehabilitation is an expansive
concept that widens nets of social control and promotes abuse
through self-delusion.160 Punishment, by contrast, frankly ac-
153. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JuRY 43-44 (1966). Guilt is
not just a factual determination but an assessment of culpability; juries pro-
vide the nexus between statutory language and the community's sense of jus-
tice in applying the law to the facts of a particular case. Feld, supra note 2, at
245 n.402.
154. P. GREENWOOD, A. LIPSON, supra note 130, at 29-54; Feld, supra note 2,
at 245 n.400.
155. Feld, supra note 2, at 244; Feld, Punishmen Treatment, supra note 3,
at 832-33.
156. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
157. Id. at 150-55.
158. The increased punitiveness of juvenile justice raises a dilemma of con-
stitutional dimensions: "Is it fair, in the constitutional sense, to expose minors
to adult sanctions for crimes, without granting them the same due process
rights as adults?" PRIVATE SECTOR TASK FORCE, supra note 91, at 6.
159. Note, The Public Right of Access to Juvenile Delinquency Hearings, 81
MIcH. L. REv. 1540, 1553 (1983).
160. Allen, Rehabilitative Ideal, supra note 10, at 32-35; see Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928)- (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Experience
should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the govern-
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knowledges that coercion is harmful and requires proportional
limits and procedural protections.161
2. The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court
Procedural justice hinges on access to and the assistance of
counsel. Gault established a constitutional right to an attorney
in delinquency proceedings.16 2 Prior to Gault, lawyers ap-
peared in perhaps five percent of delinquency cases. Shortly af-
ter Gault, observers reported that juveniles were neither
adequately advised of their rights nor had counsel appointed for
them.1 63 In most proceedings whee counsel appeared, they did
nothing.' 4
In the decades since Gault, the promise of counsel remains
unrealized. Despite legal changes, the actual delivery of legal
services lags behind the constitutional mandate. A few studies
of individual counties in a handful of states in the early 1980s
reported rates of representation ranging from twenty-two per-
cent to forty-five percent. 6 5 The only research that reports
statewide data and makes interstate comparisons, found that in
three of the six states surveyed, one-half or less of the juveniles
had counsel.166 Another study reported that in 1986, the major-
ity of youths in Minnesota were unrepresented and that varia-
tions in rates of representation ranged from one-hundred
ment's purposes are beneficent .... The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachments by men of zeal, well-meaning but without under-
standing."); F. ALLEN, supra note 10, at 33-47.
161. Cohen, supra note 86, at 5.
162. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34-42 (1967).
163. Lefstein, Stapleton & Teitelbaum, In Search of Juvenile Justice:
Gault and Its Implementation, 3 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 491, 505-16 (1969) [herein-
after Lefstein, Stapleton].
164. Ferster & Courtless, Pre-dispositional Data, Role of Counsel and Deci-
sions in a Juvenile Court, 7 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 195, 207 (1972).
165. Recent evaluations indicate that lawyers still appear less often than
might be expected. Clarke and Koch found that only 22.3% and 45.8% of
juveniles were represented in two sites in North Carolina. Clarke & Koch,
supra note 126, at 297. Aday found rates of representation of 26.2% and 38.7%
in a southeastern state. Aday, Court Structure, Defense Attorney Use, and Ju-
venile Court Decisions, 27 SoC. Q. 107, 112-14 (1986). Only 32% of juveniles in
a large north central city were represented. Walter & Ostrander, An Observa-
tional Study of a Juvenile Court, 33 Juv. & FAM. CT. J., Aug. 1982, at 53, 59.
Bortner reported that only 41.8% of juveniles in a large, midwestern county's
juvenile court had an attorney. Bortner, supra note 72, at 139.
166. In Nebraska, the rate of representation was 52.7%; in Minnesota,
47.7%; in North Dakota, only 37.5%. Feld, In re Gault Revisited: A Cross-State




percent in one county to less than five percent in several
others.167 Nearly one-third of juveniles removed from their
homes and more than one-quarter of those confined in institu-
tions never saw a lawyer.168 Although juveniles charged with
serious offenses are more likely to be represented,169 they con-
stitute a small part of juvenile court dockets. It is the far larger
group of youths charged with minor offenses who are most
likely to be incarcerated without representation. 170
The most common explanation for why so many juveniles
are unrepresented is that they waive their right to counsel.171
Courts use the adult standard, "knowing, intelligent, and volun-
tary" under the "totality of the circumstances," to assess the va-
lidity of juveniles' waivers of constitutional rights.172 The
crucial issue for juveniles, as for adults, is whether a waiver of
counsel can be "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" if it is
made without consulting with an attorney. The problem is ex-
acerbated when judges seek waivers of counsel as a predeter-
mined result. They give cursory and misleading advisories that
suggest waiver is a meaningless technicality and then become
responsible for interpreting the juvenile's response.
The "totality" approach to juveniles' waivers of rights has
been criticized as a prescription for injustice and an example of
treating juveniles just like adults when equality puts them at a
167. Feld, supra note 2, at 190 n.162; Feld, supra note 166, at 402; Feld,
supra note 126, at 1214 nn.142-43.
168. Feld, supra note 126, at 1238.
169. Feld, supra note 166, at 401-02; Feld, supra note 126, at 1220-21.
170. Feld, supra note 126, at 1239-40.
171. There are a variety of possible explanations for why so many youths
are unrepresented: parental reluctance to retain an attorney; inadequate pub-
lic-defender services in nonurban areas; judicial encouragement of waivers of
counsel in order to ease their administrative burdens; cursory and misleading
judicial advisories that suggest that waiver is simply a meaningless technical-
ity; continuing judicial hostility to an advocacy role in juvenile court; or judi-
cial predetermination of dispositions and denial of counsel where probation is
anticipated. Whatever the reasons, most juveniles in most states never see a
lawyer, waive their right to counsel without consulting with or appreciating
the consequences of relinquishing counsel, and confront the power of the State
alone and unaided. Bortner, supra note 72, at 139; W. STAPLETON & L. TErrEi-
BAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH 36 (1972); Feld, supra note 2, at 40; Feld, supra
note 126, at 1323; Lefstein, Stapleton, supra note 163, at 537-38.
172. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979); Feld, supra note 2, at 169;
Feld, supra note 126, at 1323-25. The Supreme Court has held that an adult
defendant could waive counsel and appear pro se in state criminal trials so
long as he or she chooses to do so. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834
(1975); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938).
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disadvantage. 173 Juveniles simply are not as capable as adults
to waive their constitutional rights in a knowing and intelligent
manner.174 While several states recognize this developmental
fact,175 most states, including Minnesota, allow juveniles to
waive counsel without consultation and confront the power of
the State alone and unaided.
The questionable validity of juvenile waiver raises collat-
eral legal issues. Absent a valid waiver, the appointment of
counsel is a constitutional prerequisite to any sentence restrict-
ing liberty. 7 6 Despite this doctrine, one-third of the Minnesota
juveniles removed from their homes and more than one-quar-
ter of those confined in institutions were unrepresented. It is
also unconstitutional to use prior convictions obtained without
counsel to enhance later sentences. 177 Every time juvenile
court judges use prior uncounseled convictions to sentence
juveniles, to impose mandatory minimum or enhanced
sentences, to waive juveniles to criminal court, or to "boot-
strap" status offenders into delinquents through the contempt
power, 78 they compound the injustice of the original denial of
counsel.
III. TEE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT: REFORMED BUT NOT
REHABILITATED
The recent changes in juvenile court jurisdiction, sentenc-
173. Feld, supra note 2, at 173-76; see Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to
Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1134, 1138-40
(1980) (the totality approach may not comport with Gault if "the great major-
ity of juveniles do not understand or appreciate their rights, yet are deemed to
have waived those rights").
174. T. GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS 128-30 (1981); Grisso, supra
note 173, at 1166.
175. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.11 (West 1985) (prohibiting either waivers of
counsel or incarceration of unrepresented delinquents); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.23 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990) (same). See generally INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL
ADmiN., ABA, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL (1980)
(guidelines for lawyers in dealing with juvenile cases).
176. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979).
177. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 222, 224 (1980) (per curiam); United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 449 (1972); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115
(1967). Courts have applied this principle to juvenile prior convictions as well.
See Rizzo v. United States, 821 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir. 1987); Grant v. White,
579 F.2d 48, 49 (8th Cir. 1978); see also In re J.W., 164 Ill. App. 3d 826, 830, 518
N.E.2d 310, 313 (1987) (uncounseled juvenile convictions may not be used to
adjudicate a juvenile as a habitual offender).
178. In re Walker, 282 N.C. 28, 38, 191 S.E.2d 702, 709 (1972).
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ing, and procedures reflect ambivalence about the role of juve-
nile courts and the control of children. As juvenile courts
converge procedurally and substantively with criminal courts,
is there any reason to maintain a separate court whose only dis-
tinctions are procedures under which no adult would agree to
be tried?
The juvenile court is at a philosophical crossroads that can-
not be resolved by simplistic formulations, such as treatment
versus punishment. In reality, there are no practical or opera-
tional differences between the two. Acknowledging that juve-
nile courts punish, imposes an obligation to provide all criminal
procedural safeguards because, in the words of Gault, "the con-
dition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court."179
While procedural parity with adults may sound the death-knell
of the juvenile court, to fail to do so perpetuates injustice. To
treat similarly situated juveniles differently, to punish them in
the name of treatment, and to deny them basic safeguards fos-
ters a sense of injustice that thwarts any efforts to
rehabilitate.18 0
Abolishing juvenile courts is desirable both for youths and
society. After more than two decades of constitutional and leg-
islative reform, juvenile courts continue to deflect, co-opt, ig-
nore, or absorb ameliorative tinkering with minimal
institutional change. Despite its transformation from a welfare
agency to a criminal court, the juvenile court remains essen-
tially unreformed. The quality of justice youths receive would
be intolerable if it were adults facing incarceration. Public and
political concerns about drugs and youth crime foster a "get
tough" mentality to repress rather than rehabilitate young of-
fenders. With fiscal constraints, budget deficits, and competi-
tion from other interest groups, there is little likelihood that
treatment services for delinquents will expand. Coupling the
emergence of punitive policies with our societal unwillingness
to provide for the welfare of children in general, much less to
those who commit crimes, there is simply no reason to believe
that the juvenile court can be rehabilitated.
Without a juvenile court, an adult criminal court that ad-
ministers justice for young offenders could provide children
with all the procedural guarantees already available to adult
defendants and additional enhanced protections because of the
179. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967).
180. Melton, supra note 59, at 168.
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children's vulnerability and immaturity.18 1 The only virtue of
the contemporary juvenile court is that juveniles convicted of
serious crimes receive shorter sentences than do adults.18 2
Youthfulness, however, long has been recognized as a mitigat-
ing, even if not an excusing, condition at sentencing.1as The
common law's infancy defense presumed that children below
age fourteen lacked criminal capacity, emphasized their lack of
fault, and made youthful irresponsibility explicit. Youths older
than fourteen are mature enough to be responsible for their be-
havior, but immature enough as to not deserve punishment
commensurate with adults.184 If shorter sentences for dimin-
ished responsibility is the rationale for punitive juvenile courts,
then providing an explicit "youth discount" to reduce adult
sentences can ensure an intermediate level of just punish-
ment.1 8 5 Reduced adult sentences do not require young people
to be incarcerated with adults; existing juvenile prisons allow
the segregation of offenders by age.
Full procedural parity in criminal courts coupled with
mechanisms to expunge records, restore civil rights, and the
like can more adequately protect young people than does the
current juvenile court. Abolishing juvenile courts, however,
should not gloss over the many deficiencies of criminal courts
such as excessive case loads, insufficient sentencing options, in-
effective representation, and over-reliance on plea bargains.
These are characteristics of juvenile courts as well.
Ideological changes in strategies of social control and the
conception of children produced the juvenile court. One of
these ideas, strategies of social control, no longer distinguishes
juvenile from criminal courts. Despite their inability to pre-
vent or reduce youth crime, juvenile courts survive and even
prosper. Despite statutory and judicial reforms, official discre-
tion arguably has increased rather than decreased. Why, even
181. See Feld, supra note 2, at 275-76; Melton, supra note 59, at 152; Rosen-
berg, Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with Crime: Proposal for a
Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656, 671 (1980).
182. Zimring, supra note 63, at 197.
183. Thomson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988) ("a young person is not
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without empirical support, does the ideology of therapeutic jus-
tice persist so tenaciously?
The answer is that the social control is directed at children.
Despite humanitarian claims of being a child-centered nation,
our cultural conception of children supports institutional ar-
rangements that deny the personhood of young people. In legal
doctrine, children are not entitled to liberty, but to custody.
We care less about other people's children than we do our own,
especially when those children are of other colors or
cultures.' 86
Children, especially by adolescence, are more competent
than the law acknowledges.187 We can recognize young people's
competence as a basis for greater autonomy without equating it
with full criminal responsibility. Many social institutions -
families, schools, the economy, and the law - systematically
disable adolescents, deny them opportunities to be responsible
and autonomous, and then use the resulting immaturity to jus-
tify imposing further disabilities. Rejecting the juvenile court's
premise that young people are inherently irresponsible can be-
gin a process of reexamining childhood that extends to every
institution that touches their lives.
186. J. SuTrON, SuPra note 12, at 257.
187. Melton, supra note 59, at*153.
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